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NO VOICE, NO EXIT, BUT LOYALTY?
PUERTO RICO AND CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION
Guy-Uriel Charles* & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer**
INTRODUCTION
“Colonialism hurts” is the opening line of a book review penned in 
the pages of the Harvard Law Review by the distinguished Second Circuit 
jurist Jose Cabranes.1 Cabranes, who was born in Puerto Rico, was re-
viewing a book by his fellow jurist and Second Circuit colleague, Juan 
Torruella. Torruella, equally distinguished as Cabranes and also born in 
Puerto Rico, wrote a book lamenting the second-class status of American 
citizens living on the island of Puerto Rico. Summarizing Torruella’s ar-
gument, Cabranes writes,
since 1898, when Puerto Rico (along with the Philippines) 
was ceded by Spain to the United States, the island and its 
people have lived under colonialism professed or camou-
flaged—ruled, to one degree or another, by a government in 
Washington in which they play virtually no role and con-
signed to a separate and inferior position within the American 
constitutional system.2
Torruella equated the legal status of Puerto Rican citizens living on 
the island to that of African Americans living under Jim Crow segrega-
tion, “separate and unequal.”3 Puerto Rico is not a state but an unincor-
porated territory, subject to oversight by Congress. Speaking for himself, 
Cabranes remarked that the people of Puerto Rico “are still subject to 
the laws and regulations adopted by the political branches of the national 
government before which they appear only as supplicants; and that na-
* Edward and Ellen Schwarzman Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
** Professor of Law and Class of 1950 Herman B. Wells Endowed Professor, Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law
1. José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 450, 450 (1986) (book review).
2. Id. at 452.
3. Id. at 463.
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tional government retains virtually unlimited discretion to determine 
whether or how the island will fit into national policy.”4
As citizens of the United States, Puerto Ricans are subject to the 
Constitution and laws of the United States yet do not have a voice in 
federal elections. More problematically, they do not have ultimate con-
trol over their domestic affairs. Consider the financial situation of Puerto 
Rico. Puerto Rico is in the midst of a dire financial crisis. The debt load 
has reached historic levels, and the Puerto Rican government cannot ser-
vice it. Industries left the island as soon as Congress ended their favorable 
tax status in 2006.5 Emigration has increased post-Hurricane Maria. In 
the face of these challenges, there is little the government of Puerto Rico 
can do. It cannot declare bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the federal 
bankruptcy code, because the law does not explicitly apply to Puerto Ri-
co.6 It also cannot enact its own debt-restructuring statutes, because fed-
eral law preempts Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act.7 Puerto Rico is on an 
economic death spiral, and the only thing it can do is wait for the federal 
government to provide a solution. Enter the PROMESA Act,8 the most 
recent example of the status of Puerto Ricans as second-class citizens.
The most important feature of the Act, and the one at the center of 
the most recent constitutional controversy over the status of the island, 
created a Financial Management and Oversight Board. This is a seven-
member board appointed by the president without Senate confirmation, 
of which six members are chosen from a list approved by the congres-
sional leaders. The Act explicitly states that the purpose of the Board is 
“to provide a method for a covered territory to achieve fiscal responsibil-
ity and access to the capital markets.”9 Among its many features, the Act 
authorizes the Board “to file for bankruptcy on behalf of Puerto Rico or 
its instrumentalities”;10 to require the governor of Puerto Rico to submit 
to the Board her budget and monthly or quarterly reports, as the Board 
deems necessary to do its work;11 to manage and modify local laws and 
Puerto Rico’s budget to “achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the 
4. Id. at 461.
5. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, sec. 1601, 
§ 936(j), 110 Stat. 1755, 1827.
6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c), 101(40), (52).
7. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
8. 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241.
9. Id. § 2121(a).
10. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 
1655 (2020) (interpreting § 2164(a)).
11. § 2121(d)(1)(B).
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capital markets”;12 and, in doing this work, to conduct investigations and 
gather evidence.13
Creditors challenged the constitutionality of the Board. Specifically, 
they argued that Board members were “Officers of the United States” 
and may only join the Board with the advice and consent of the Senate as 
required by the Appointments Clause. In Financial Oversight and Manage-
ment Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, the Supreme Court 
agreed that the Appointments Clause applies to all “ ‘Officers of the 
United States,’ even when those officers exercise power in or related to 
Puerto Rico.”14 The question in the case, and what to the Court was a 
difficult question, was whether board members were “Officers of the 
United States” requiring Senate confirmation.15 The Court acknowl-
edged that “the Board possesses considerable power—including the au-
thority to substitute its own judgment for the considered judgment of the 
Governor and other elected officials.”16 And yet, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the board, concluding that “this power primarily con-
cerns local matters.”17
We leave it to others to decide whether the Court’s constitutional 
analysis persuades them as a matter of law or policy. In this brief Essay, 
we want to return to the concern articulated by Judges Cabranes and 
Torruella, the second-class and colonial status of Puerto Rico. We want 
to explore a question that scholars seldom ask in this context, a question 
that is implicit in the worries articulated by Cabranes and Torruella, and 
important to critical race theorists who think about the role of law in 
maintaining structural subordination.18 Our inquiry is wrestling with how 
our constitutional system, which is committed to the principles of indi-
vidual liberty and self-government, can reconcile itself with the current 
status of Puerto Rico, in which the people have very little control over 
their domestic affairs. We often wonder how our Constitution and juris-
prudence have reconciled our nation’s fundamental commitments with 
the reality of racial inequality and subordination. The status of Puerto 
Rico presents a contemporary exploration of those concerns. Through 
Puerto Rico, we can see how law and the constitutional structure simply 
ignores structural subordination.
12. §§ 2141–2147. 
13. § 2141.
14. 140 S. Ct. at 1658.
15. Aurelius Inv., 140 S. Ct. at 1654.
16. Id. at 1662.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT, at xxv (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas 
eds., 1995).
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In his classic book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in 
Firms, Organizations, and States, the economist Albert Hirschman articu-
lated a frame that has come to preoccupy constitutional theory.19 To re-
frame and broaden an inquiry articulated by one constitutional scholar, 
much of constitutional theory is fundamentally occupied with a single 
question: What does democratic constitutionalism owe its subjects?20
Hirschman’s framework supplies a ready answer for students of democra-
cy: voice, primarily; exit, to a lesser extent; and loyalty, to an ever lesser 
extent. Hirschman’s fundamental inquiry is motivated by an arresting ob-
servation and declaration. Hirschman notes: “Firms and other organiza-
tions are conceived to be permanently and randomly subject to decline
and decay . . . no matter how well the institutional framework within 
which they function is designed.”21 Put differently and translated into the 
context of democratic governance—which is also an object of Hirsch-
man’s concerns—democratic institutions will invariably decay, by which 
Hirschman seems to mean that they will gradually and increasingly work 
less well for their intended beneficiaries.22 Of interest to Hirschman are 
the options available to individuals—consumers, voters, members of a 
club—for affecting change within an institution—firm, organization, or 
government—when the performance of the institution deteriorates. As 
Hirschman put it, “it is likely that the very process of decline activates 
certain counterforces.”23 In Hirschman’s framework, those “counterforc-
es” are voice or exit, mediated by loyalty.
Under Hirschman’s approach, if people are unhappy with their po-
litical systems—and recall that Hirschman predicts that people will be 
unhappy with their political systems because deterioration or decline, 
which leads to unhappiness, is “an ever-present force constantly on the 
attack”—they can register their unhappiness by exercising either their 
voice or their option to exit.24 Hirschman’s approach presupposes the 
availability of either voice or exit. When exit is not an option, voice is 
the only mechanism of registering dissent. When voice is not an option, 
exit is the only mechanism for expressing dissatisfaction. Loyalty—a per-
son’s affection for the enterprise—is ultimately a function of the availabil-
19. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
20. Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1349 
(2013) (“[M]uch of constitutional theory is preoccupied with a single question: What 
does a democracy owe its minorities?”).
21. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 15.
22. Hirschman defines decay as a “gradual loss of rationality, efficiency, and surplus-
producing energy.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 15.
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ity and effectiveness of voice.25 A dissatisfied person will remain loyal so 
long as they believe that they (or someone who represents their views) 
have influence to effect change.
Democratic systems, democratic theory, and constitutional theory 
have placed a great deal of attention on the voice option because the exit 
option is nearly nonexistent and if available significantly impractical. But 
what happens when a political subject has neither voice nor exit? What 
happens when a political subject has very little agency to affect change? 
How does constitutional theory and constitutional law respond?
These questions go to the heart of the status of Puerto Rico under 
U.S. law. Why is Puerto Rico bound under a constitutional framework 
within which it has very little voice and no real exit options? How does 
constitutional theory justify this state of affairs? Puerto Rico—along with 
all existing U.S. territories—thus offers an intriguing puzzle as well as a 
treasure trove for democratic theorists and students of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. For the reality is inconceivable yet no less true: to be a citizen of 
Puerto Rico is to be a happy slave, as the condition is understood and 
deployed as a trope of classical liberalism.26 Citizens of Puerto Rico have 
no right to participation and have very little political autonomy, which 
affects their material well-being. Yet, they are bound by a document that 
promises freedom and self-governance.
We examine these important questions in three Parts. Part I offers a 
brief history of Puerto Rico under U.S. rule. Part II considers the impli-
cations of this status. This is the question of constitutional authority and 
obligation. This is a crucial point. We do not take a view on the status 
question as seen and lived by the people of Puerto Rico. Whether the 
island achieves statehood, independence, or continues under its present 
status, however, the political subordination of the island must end. Part 
III concludes with a brief look at the “Puerto Rico Self-Determination 
Act of 2020,” introduced in the House by Representatives Velázquez and 
Ocasio-Cortez.
I. A Brief History of Puerto Rico
When General Nelson A. Miles led the U.S. invasion of Puerto Ri-
co, landing in the southwestern city of Guánica on July 25, 1898, he 
found little resistance. The U.S. Army secured the island within a month, 
and on December 10 of that year Spain and the United States signed the 
Treaty of Paris, ending hostilities between the two nations. For the tidy 
sum of twenty million dollars, Spain relinquished sovereignty of Cuba 
25. Id. at 77–78.
26. See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY
(1989).
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and ceded to the United States the islands of Guam and Puerto Rico, 
both of which continue to be under U.S. control to this day.27 Of partic-
ular interest to us is Article IX of the Treaty, which explained that “[t]he 
civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories 
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Con-
gress.”28 Three statutes bear on this question.
The first is the Organic Act of 1900, known as the Foraker Act, and 
which established a civilian government for the island.29 The Act was no-
table for the things it did not include. For example, it did not include a 
Bill of Rights for the island, nor did it extend U.S. citizenship to island 
residents. Instead, it created the new status of “citizens of [Puerto] Ri-
co.”30 The Act also did not settle the question of travel to and from the 
United States. One year later, the Supreme Court took up the question 
whether the Constitution allowed the United States to become an impe-
rial power. This was a question imbued by the racism of its time.31 Long-
standing precedent could not have been clearer: a territory “is acquired to 
become a State; and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress 
with absolute authority.”32 Ironically, Chief Justice Taney explained in 
Dred Scott that “[a] power . . . in the General Government to obtain and 
hold colonies and dependent territories, over which they might legislate 
without restriction, would be inconsistent with its own existence in its 
present form.”33 But rather than face the logic of this argument head on, 
the Supreme Court did the next best thing: the Court either distin-
guished the cases34 or else ignored the argument altogether.35 In the Insu-
lar Cases,36 the Court ultimately drew a line on the concept of incorpora-
27. Treaty of Peace, Spain-U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1756.
28. Id. at 1759.
29. Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
30. Id. at 79.
31. Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular 
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JURÍDICA U. P.R. 225, 284–291 (1996) (discussing racism, 
manifest destiny, social Darwinism, and the construction of the “other” that appeared in 
the Insular Cases and other cases from that time period).
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 447 (1857).
33. Id. at 448.
34. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 274 (1901) (plurality opinion).
35. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that “[t]he idea that this country may acquire 
territories anywhere upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere colo-
nies . . . is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius as well as with the words of the 
Constitution.” Id. at 380 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. The Insular Cases decided several issues concerning the status of newly acquired 
Puerto Rico. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 
221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 
182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes, 182 U.S. 244; Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 
182 U.S. 392 (1901).
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tion. The Constitution applied to the territories qua states only after 
Congress had chosen to incorporate the given territory into the United 
States.37 Before that moment, that is, so long as territories remain unin-
corporated, Congress has “power to locally govern at discretion.”38 But 
Congress did not have limitless power over unincorporated territories. 
Some constitutional principles, those that “are the basis of all free gov-
ernment[s],”39 would still apply.
The second relevant statute is the Jones Act of 1917, which collec-
tively naturalized all Puerto Rican citizens living on the island.40 This was 
a crucial moment in the relationship between the United States and 
Puerto Rico. Over a decade before, the Court concluded that those liv-
ing on the island “were constituted a body politic under the name of The 
People of Porto Rico.”41 But nothing had changed; this was a status be-
tween an “alien” under the immigration laws and formal U.S. citizen-
ship.42 The Foraker Act only formalized the status of non-citizen national 
begun by the Treaty of Paris. Incorporation was key, and recent prece-
dents about the incorporations of Alaska and Hawaii strongly suggested 
that citizenship was the determinative signal from Congress about its in-
tentions to incorporate a territory.43 If so, the Jones Act might have been 
that signal for Puerto Rico. But five years later, in Balzac v. Porto Rico,44 a
unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the Jones Act was not clear 
on the question of incorporation and Congress would not have taken this 
“important step” by “mere inference.”45 Balzac thus extended the coloni-
al project begun by the Insular Cases. Citizenship for the people of Puerto 
Rico meant only the right to travel to and from the United States.46
The third statute is the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of
1950,47 which authorized the drafting by the people of Puerto Rico of 
their own constitution. With a few amendments, the U.S. Congress rati-
fied the proposal by the constitutional convention of Puerto Rico on July 
37. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287–88 (White, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 290.
39. Id. at 290–91.
40. Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1402).
41. Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 11 (1904).
42. Id.
43. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 522 (1905); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 
190 U.S. 197, 217–18 (1903) (concluding that Newlands Resolution does not require full 
application of the Constitution to Hawaii, since it is only an annexed territory, not yet 
incorporated, and the rights at issue are not fundamental but procedural).
44. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
45. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 306.
46. See id. at 308.
47. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319.
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25, 1952. Might this be the moment when Congress incorporated the 
island? In a word, no. The law had the potential to transform the rela-
tionship between Puerto Rico and the United States as one grounded on 
consensual norms. According to Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, for exam-
ple, “the principle that the relationship is from now on one of consent 
through free agreement, wipes out all trace of colonialism.”48 Yet Con-
gress clearly felt otherwise. Time and again, members of Congress ex-
pressed the view that Public Law 600 and the enactment of a Puerto Ri-
can Constitution did not alter the prior relationship between Puerto 
Rico and the United States.49 Further, Congress had to ultimately ap-
prove the Constitution itself and reserved the right to object and ulti-
mately eliminate any provisions it disapproved.50 Most damningly, Con-
gress could even revoke the Constitution of Puerto Rico unilaterally;51 as 
Luis Muñoz Marín himself conceded during a congressional hearing in 
1950, “if the people of Puerto Rico should go crazy, Congress can al-
ways get around and legislate again.”52 The Court agreed, writing years 
later that Puerto Rico was not yet incorporated but more “statelike” after 
the establishment of commonwealth status in 1952.53 To this day, Puerto 
Rico continues to be an unincorporated territory, subject to the plenary 
powers of Congress.
II. Constitutional Obligation and Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico’s loss of sovereignty is undeniable. Consider the appli-
cation of the death penalty to the island. The Puerto Rico Constitution 
unambiguously declares that “[t]he death penalty shall not exist.”54 In 
contrast, the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 authorizes the death pen-
48. JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE 
WORLD 115 (1997) (citing a letter from Governor Muñoz Marín to President Truman 
while transmitting the new constitution); see also ALFREDO MONTALVO-BARBOT,
POLITICAL CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN PUERTO RICO, 1898–1952, at 
143 (1997) (contending that “[i]n general, the presentation of the Puerto Rican people as 
passive agents in the constitutional transformation of the island, an argument advanced by 
gradualists and traditional colonialist studies, is analytically and empirically simplistic and 
questionable”).
49. See José Trías Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View 
of the Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JURÍDICA U. P.R. 1, 10 (1999); TRÍAS 
MONGE, supra note 48, at 129.
50. See TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 48, at 114–18.
51. See id.
52. Puerto Rico Constitution: Hearings on H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 Before the H. Comm. on 
Pub. Lands, 81st Cong. 33 (1950) (statement of Governor Luis Muñoz Marín).
53. See Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 
572, 594 (1976).
54. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
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alty across the United States for numerous offenses.55 Is Puerto Rico part 
of the United States for purposes of the Death Penalty Act? Congress 
provided an answer with section 734 of the Puerto Rican Federal Rela-
tions Act, adopted in 1950. Under the Act, “[t]he statutory laws of the 
United States not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same force and ef-
fect in Puerto Rico as in the United States.”56 If a federal law is locally 
inapplicable, in other words, it has no force in Puerto Rico. In United 
States v. Acosta-Martinez,57 the First Circuit held that the death penalty 
applies to Puerto Rico.
This is not an easy question.58 As a legal matter, the district court in 
Acosta -Martinez in fact concluded that the Federal Death Penalty Act “is 
locally inapplicable within the meaning of section 9 of the PRFRA.”59
The court so concluded because the Death Penalty Act was not explicitly 
applied to Puerto Rico, and also because “Puerto Rico’s culture, tradi-
tions and values are repugnant to the death penalty.”60 The court also 
noted, on substantive due process grounds, that “[i]t shocks the con-
science to impose the ultimate penalty, death, upon American citizens 
who are denied the right to participate directly or indirectly in the gov-
ernment that enacts and authorizes the imposition of such punishment.”61
In a short opinion, the First Circuit bluntly reversed. As the panel 
explained, the meaning of the phrase “locally inapplicable” is a matter of 
congressional intent.62 Commentators agree. This is essentially a “blank 
check” for Congress to rule on island affairs as it wishes.63 The panel fur-
ther explained that the default rule is that a federal law applies to Puerto 
Rico under section 734. The panel concluded that Congress was clear in 
its intention to apply the death penalty in Puerto Rico.64 And as to the 
due process claim, the court breezily concluded that “[i]t cannot shock 
the conscience of the court to apply to Puerto Rico, as intended by 
Congress, a federal penalty for a federal crime which Congress has ap-
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598.
56. 48 U.S.C. § 734 (emphasis added).
57. 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
58. See generally Ricardo Alfonso, The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Puerto Rico: A 
Human Rights Crisis in the Path Towards Self-Determination, 76 REV. JURÍDICA U. P.R.
1077 (2007); Elizabeth Vicens, Application of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico: A 
New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 350 (2005).
59. United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (D. P.R. 2000).
60. Id. (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. at 326–27 (emphasis omitted).
62. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 18.
63. See Rafael Pérez-Bachs, The Applicability of the United States Constitution and 
Federal Laws to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Remarks at the First Circuit Judicial 
Conference (Nov. 1985), in 110 F.R.D. 449, 485, 487 (1986).
64. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 18–20.
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plied to the fifty states.”65 The argument in this case was thus political, 
the court explained, not legal.
The irony is inescapable. The panel asks a disenfranchised citizenry 
to seek solutions through the very political process that denies their full 
citizenship. As Judge Torruella put it in a related case,
When this status of second-class citizenship is added to the al-
so judicially-established rule that grants Congress plenary 
powers over the territories and their inhabitants, i.e., that rec-
ognizes in Congress practically unfettered authority over the 
territories and their inhabitants, one has to ask what effective
political process is the lead opinion suggesting be turned to by 
Appellants to resolve the constitutional issues raised by this 
case?66
Judge Torruella’s question gets us to the heart of our project. Why does 
federal law apply to Puerto Rico? More pointedly, how is section 734 a 
legitimate exercise of congressional authority? This is not an easy ques-
tion, though it is largely ignored. Put more forcefully, under what theory 
of legal or constitutional obligation may federal laws control the actions 
of Puerto Rico?67
Consider the question as applied to one of the fifty states. The state 
of North Carolina, for example, was one of the original signatories to the 
U.S. Constitution. Moving forward, its congressional delegation could 
“pull, haul and trade”68 with other representatives for the benefit of not 
only North Carolina but the United States generally. To be sure, North 
Carolina would not win every congressional debate; but what North 
Carolina could not do is say it had no voice in the process. And in the 
end, North Carolina could always invoke the protections of the Tenth
Amendment.
This is, in a nutshell, the story of the rise and fall of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Debates in Congress were heated, and Senator Ervin 
expressed the views of the state of North Carolina clearly and forcefully.69
In the end, the state became a partially covered jurisdiction, so its laws 
65. Id. at 21.
66. Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 614 (1st Cir. 2010) (Torruella, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
67. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Pro-
spects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 28 (1994) (“A deeper puzzle remains, however. The 
Insular Cases concerned constitutional limits on federal powers. How is it, then, that the 
Constitution applies to acts of the Commonwealth government?” (emphasis omitted)).
68. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
69. Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 
27–29 (1965).
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were subject to the Act’s preclearance requirement. The critics were out-
raged, analogizing the states subject to the coverage requirement as “con-
quered provinces.”70 But until the next debate, they could not complain 
of an unfair process or a lack of voice. They lost. And a few years ago, 
though a majority of North Carolina’s congressional delegation agreed to 
extend the coverage requirement,71 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
the coverage formula under the Tenth Amendment,72 which references 
the powers reserved to the states at the Founding.73
Compare this brief description to similar federal laws that applied to 
Puerto Rico. Though the Puerto Rican Constitution forbids wiretap-
ping, federal law authorizes it, and so wiretapping is legal on the island.74
Though the Puerto Rican Constitution explicitly forbids the death pen-
alty, federal law prescribes it for specific offenses, so local criminal de-
fendants may in fact be subject to the death penalty.75 And though the 
elderly, the blind, and the handicapped are entitled to federal funds under 
the Supplemental Security Income program of Social Security so long as 
they live in one of the fifty states, they are not similarly entitled if they 
live in Puerto Rico. This is because Congress defined “the United 
States” as “the 50 States and the District of Columbia.” Congress did not 
intend to include Puerto Rico under its statutory definition of the “Unit-
ed States.” Making matters worse, a person may receive benefits when 
living within the statutorily defined states yet lose them as soon as they 
move to Puerto Rico.76
Under what theory of constitutional obligation are residents of 
Puerto Rico bound by these laws? Commentators approach this question 
from the opposite end: Where does the United States derive its power 
over foreign affairs? Though the power over foreign affairs is not explicit-
ly granted in the Constitution, the Supreme Court ratified the doctrine 
of implied powers in the late Nineteenth Century,77 in decisions about 
noncitizens,78 American Indians,79 and the territories.80 These cases relied 
70. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., concurring 
and dissenting).
71. Roll Call 374 | Bill Number: H.R. 9, CLERK U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(July 13, 2006, 5:38 PM), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2006374 [https://perma.cc
/F334-96UN].
72. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
74. United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1985).
75. United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
76. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
77. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu 
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
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on concepts of sovereignty and a “new vision of the national government 
as a complete sovereign, possessing all the powers enjoyed by authoritari-
an European states in its external relations.”81 But of course, this was a 
racist, nativist vision, and the subjects of these cases were the classic oth-
ers, “non-citizens and who were racially, culturally, and religiously dis-
tinct from the nation’s Anglo-Saxon, Christian elites.”82 The doctrine of
implied powers in foreign affairs thus grew within the silences and inter-
stices of our constitutional structure in order to accommodate the nation-
building, expansionist impulses of the late nineteenth century. So much is 
clear.
What is less clear is why the people of Puerto Rico must acquiesce 
to their colonial condition. Why acquiesce to plenary power, arbitrary 
rule, and total disenfranchisement? One answer posits that the people of 
Puerto Rico must acquiesce to federal rule and its concomitant laws as a
moral imperative. John Rawls explains, for example, that “we are to 
comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and 
apply to us.”83 So stated, the answer immediately falls short as applied to 
Puerto Rico. This is a theory that demands acquiescence from just insti-
tutions. Such a theory cannot possibly posit an argument to justify colo-
nialism.
Another answer, on teleological grounds,84 is that Puerto Rico 
greatly benefits from its relationship with the United States. For example, 
and as the Supreme Court explained in Balzac v. Porto Rico,85 U.S. citi-
zenship placed the people of Puerto Rico “as individuals on an exact 
equality with citizens from the American homeland”; it “secure[d] them 
more certain protection” against the rest of the world; and it placed the 
rights of U.S. citizenship a mere plane ride away, if they chose to move 
“into the United States proper.”86 Further, the people of Puerto Rico re-
ceive many financial benefits from its relationship with the United States, 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Stephens v. Cherokee 
Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee 
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
80. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
81. Cleveland, supra note 77, at 12.
82. Id. at 11.
83. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 334 (photo. reprt. 2005) (1971).
84. These are arguments about ends (i.e., telos), about costs and benefits, and about the 
purposes of our obligations or their likely consequences. See R.M. Hare, Political Obliga-
tion, in SOCIAL ENDS AND POLITICAL MEANS 1 (Ted Honderich ed., 1976).
85. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
86. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311.
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such as Medicare, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI.87 The island has also bene-
fited from internal improvements.88 Island residents receive these benefits 
even though they do not pay federal income taxes.
The economic picture is not quite as tidy, however. To begin, is-
land residents do not pay federal income taxes, true, but they pay a host 
of other taxes, including “payroll taxes, social security taxes, business tax-
es, gift taxes, [and] estate taxes.”89 Also, the island is subject to the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1920 (i.e., the Jones Act), which requires goods and 
passengers moving from one U.S. port to another to be on U.S. ships. 
The Act also requires that those ships be built, owned, and operated by 
U.S. citizens.90 The economic impact of the Act on Puerto Rico and its 
citizenry is severe.91 This has been a complicated relationship from the 
beginning; “[w]ithin the first 10 years of the U.S. occupation of Puerto 
Rico,” explains historian Lillian Guerra, “U.S. sugar interests had pretty 
much taken over, and the Puerto Rican coffee class has been displaced 
entirely.”92 To this day, Puerto Rico is “still a country that is dominated 
by U.S. investors . . . [a]nd . . . most U.S. companies pay virtually no 
taxes to the Puerto Rican state.”93
On costs and benefits alone, then, it is hardly clear that the people 
of Puerto Rico are the winners. As Judge Cabranes put it, Puerto Rico 
has paid a very steep price for its relationship with the United States: 
87. See Jo Craven McGinty, Statehood for Puerto Ricans: Billions More in U.S. Programs—
And in Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/statehood-for-puerto-ricans-billions-more-in-u-s-programsand-in-taxes-1509714000 
[https://perma.cc/S8XE-39TD].
88. See José A. Cabranes, U.S. Dist. Judge for the Dist. of Conn., Puerto Rico and the 
Constitution, Remarks at the First Circuit Judicial Conference (Nov. 1985), in 110 
F.R.D. 449, 475, 479 (1986).
89. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Puerto Rico Pays Taxes. The US Is Obligated to Help 
It Just as Much as Texas and Florida, VOX (Oct. 4, 2017, 9:50 AM), https://www.vox.com
/policy-and-politics/2017/10/4/16385658/puerto-rico-taxes-hurricane [https://perma.cc
/PNE5-BKWF]; see also Nelson A. Denis, Taxing Puerto Rico to Death, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-taxing-
puerto-rico-to-death-20180110-story.html [https://perma.cc/52VB-G6SQ] (“Puerto 
Ricans on the island are the most heavily taxed of all U.S. citizens.”).
90. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 50101.
91. Nelson A. Denis, Opinion, The Jones Act: The Law Strangling Puerto Rico, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/hurricane-
puerto-rico-jones-act.html [https://perma.cc/B74Z-EANS] (explaining that the Act “is 
strangling the island’s economy”); see Keli’i Akina & Andy Blom, Opinion, Aloha, Puerto 
Rico, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2016, 5:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aloha-puerto-
rico-1465163389 [https://perma.cc/3UXT-HELF].
92. Becky Little, Puerto Rico’s Complicated History with the United States, HISTORY (Sept. 
22, 2017) (updated Sep. 15, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/puerto-ricos-
complicated-history-with-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/R6GM-L6WA].
93. Id.
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“political subordination and a deep, abiding sense of dependency and 
powerlessness.”94 Teleological arguments cannot possibly be the source of 
Puerto Rico’s constitutional obligations.
A third argument is firmly rooted in democratic theory and Ameri-
can constitutional principles. This is consent theory, which argues that 
the people of Puerto Rico consented to their present status.95 The con-
sent may be explicit, dating back to 1952, when Puerto Rico enacted its 
own constitution under congressional authority vested by Public Law 
600.96 There is much to say for this view. Both the Constitution of Puer-
to Rico and Public Law 600 label the relationship between the United 
States and Puerto Rico as a “compact.”97 Also, many courts and com-
mentators refer to the relationship as a “compact.”98 As if to leave no 
doubts, President Truman described the relationship as “based on mutual 
consent and esteem.”99
The consent may also be implicit,100 rooted in the fact that the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico readily acquiesce to their political condition. There 
are no marches, no large-scale demonstrations, and, to be sure, the peo-
94. Cabranes, supra note 88.
95. See Trías Monge, supra note 49, at 27 (explaining that “only consent can supply an 
adequate basis for the institution of government”). For a similar inquiry as applied to 
American Indians in U.S. history, see Seth Davis, American Colonialism and Constitutional 
Redemption, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1751 (2017).
96. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, § 2, 64 Stat. 319, 
319 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 731(c)).
97. Public Law 600 states: “[T]his Act is now adopted in the nature of a com-
pact . . . .” Id. § 1, 64 Stat. at 319 (providing for the organization of a constitutional gov-
ernment by the people of Puerto Rico). Article I of the Constitution of Puerto Rico 
states that the political power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico “shall be exer-
cised . . . within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Ri-
co and the United States of America.” P.R. CONST. art. I, § 1.
98. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 671 (1974); Ex-
amining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 593–94
(1976); United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42–43 (1st Cir. 1985); RAYMOND 
CARR, PUERTO RICO: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 77–78 (1984) (arguing that the rela-
tionship between the United States and Puerto Rico is based on a compact as a result of 
the 1952 referendum and adoption of the Puerto Rican constitution); Rafael Hernández 
Colón, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Territory or State?, 19 REV. COLEGIO DE 
ABOGADOS P.R. 207 (1959); Arnold Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Trying 
to Gain Dignity and Maintain Culture, 17 REV. JURÍDICA U. INTERAMERICANA P.R. 1
(1982) (contending that the Supreme Court has accepted the “compact” reading); Calvert 
Magruder, The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5, 9–16 (1953).
99. JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE 
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 158 (1985) (quoting statement of President 
Truman, July 3, 1952).
100. See Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1686 (2016) (“The 
democratic authority of the Constitution is grounded in the people’s implicit consent to 
the legal and political arrangements it affirms.”).
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ple of Puerto Rico choose to stay as members, however subjugated they 
may be, of the American political community. Also, island residents have 
renewed their commitment to the status quo through six nonbinding 
plebiscites (or at the very least, have shown great ambivalence toward re-
solving the status question).101 Finally, exit offers a final resolution; by 
choosing to stay, the people of Puerto Rico implicitly consent to their 
status.
These arguments also fall short. We need an argument to legitimize 
political obligation under plenary powers and political powerlessness. We 
need an argument, that is, to legitimize colonialism.102 Consent theory is 
not that argument. Descriptively, we happily concede that the people of 
Puerto Rico were not “passive agents in the constitutional transformation 
of the island.”103 But that only shows that the people of Puerto Rico 
agreed to a political condition that renders them subservient to the arbi-
trary will of another. This is, at best, “colonialism with the consent of the 
governed.”104 These are not grounds upon which political obligation may 
be established.105
101. Ediberto Román, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Coloni-
alism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 39 (1998); see John C. Fortier, The Constitution Is Clear: 
Only States Vote in Congress, 116 YALE L.J.F. 403 (2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org
/forum/the-constitution-is-clear-only-states-vote-in-congress [https://perma.cc/SW7M-
ZD33] (“Puerto Rico’s referenda, in which the island’s citizens have voted against state-
hood and in favor of commonwealth status, suggest that the values of democracy may be 
best served by honoring that outcome and retaining commonwealth status.”).
102. See TORRUELLA, supra note 99; Cabranes, supra note 1 (referring to status as coloni-
alism); see also JAMES EDWARD KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
IN AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 119 (1982) (“The establishment of commonwealth status 
perpetrated the myth that Puerto Ricans had exercised the right to self-determination. 
But that was not the case. With the acceptance of the new status, Puerto Rico was not 
offered statehood, yet it was no longer a colony in the sense that it had been.”); Jon M. 
Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-
Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 515–16 (1992) (describing Puerto Rico’s colonial 
status). But see David M. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes 
Are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, in 110 F.R.D. 449, 452, 465 (1986) 
(“In my opinion there is a compact, in the nature of an understanding based on consid-
erations of political morality, limited to the Constitution of Puerto Rico and the provi-
sions of Acts 600 and 447 which relate to the internal affairs of the Island.”).
103. MONTALVO-BARBOT, supra note 48, at 143 (“In general, the presentation of the 
Puerto Rican people as passive agents in the constitutional transformation of the island, an 
argument advanced by gradualist and traditional colonialist studies, is analytically and em-
pirically simplistic and questionable.”); Helfeld, supra note 102, at 458.
104. Cabranes, supra note 88, at 483 n.26 (explaining that “the phrase ‘colonialism with 
the consent of the governed’ is a familiar one in Puerto Rico’s politics”); see Trías 
Monge, supra note 49; Cabranes, supra note 1, at 463 (“Colonialism with the consent of 
the governed is a painful fact of life for all politically conscious Puerto Ricans, including 
those who a generation ago hoped to establish the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as a 
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CONCLUSION
The central question in the debate over the status of Puerto Rico is 
also a question few bother to ask: Why do laws enacted by a foreign 
body bind the people of Puerto Rico? Put a different way, under what 
theory of constitutional authority and obligation are the people of Puerto 
Rico duty-bound to obey the U.S. Constitution? Are the people of 
Puerto Rico agents with real voice and exit options vis-à-vis the Ameri-
can constitutional structure? These are not easy questions with ready an-
swers. Traditional theories of consent only get us so far.
Think first about the history of Puerto Rico post-1898, and specifi-
cally about the process by which the island became an American territo-
ry, its residents American citizens. In 1898, in the aftermath of that 
“splendid little war,”106 Spain relinquished Puerto Rico to the United 
States, along with Guam and the Philippines.107 On the eve of World 
War I, the United States enacted the Jones Act of 1917 and conferred cit-
izenship upon the people of Puerto Rico.108 A crucial fact is that both of 
these historical occurrences entailed little effort on the part of Puerto Ri-
co or its citizens; they were not active agents engaged in acts of self-
determination but mere war bounty, a relinquished territory subject to 
the commands of another. They did not engage in the deliberative enter-
prise and subsequent decisionmaking fit for agents active in their pursuits 
of happiness, or whatever else they wished to pursue. Rather, their pre-
‘middle road to freedom,’ assertedly to avoid the economic risks of independence and the 
cultural ‘assimilation’ of statehood.”).
105. See United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1172 (1st Cir. 1987) (Torruel-
la, J., concurring); Cabranes, supra note 1, at 481; David M. Helfeld, Congressional Intent 
and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
21 REV. JURÍDICA U. P.R. 255, 307 (1952) (“Though the formal title has been changed, 
in constitutional theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress con-
tinues to possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico.”); Trías Monge, 
supra note 49, at 27 (“The subjection of a people to the arbitrary will of another, the ex-
ercise of plenary power over dependent territory, is not permissible.”); see also id. at 28 
(“Under the principles of liberty and equality no plenary powers can be exercised by one 
people over another, even with their general consent.”).
106. The words were written by John Hay, then United States ambassador to England, 
in a letter to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. See FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LITTLE 
WAR 3 (1958).
107. The Philippine islands were sold for twenty million dollars. The World of 1898: The 
Spanish-American War, LIB. CONG: HISP. DIV., https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898
/intro.html [https://perma.cc/XH8J-HC6X].
108. Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1402).
WINTER 2021] No Voice, No Exit, But Loyalty? 149
sent political and constitutional status simply happened to them, as they 
were transferred to the United States as part of the spoils of war.109
Think also about everything you think you know about the law of 
democracy and democratic theory more generally. This is the stuff of 
fifth-grade civics: the right to vote is reserved for citizens;110 voting is a
“fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights”;111
and citizenship “is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisi-
tion.”112 These axioms should apply fully to citizens of Puerto Rico: birth 
on the island confers American citizenship and all the rights, fundamental 
or otherwise, that attach to that status. But they don’t. The status of 
Puerto Rico and its citizenry offers a shameful illustration of political 
process failure and the shortcomings of American democracy. Though 
citizens at birth,113 the people of Puerto Rico have no direct voice in na-
tional elections and are subject to the plenary powers of Congress. Un-
questionably, the present constitutional and political status of Puerto Ri-
co is indefensible on grounds of democratic theory and incompatible 
with American constitutional values.
Consider what political theorists tell us about why citizens must 
obey the Constitution. The easiest justification came soon after ratifica-
tion, when citizens may be said to have directly consented to the Consti-
tution as fundamental law. The justification becomes more complex as 
time passes and new generations replace old.114 The justification is harder 
still, perhaps untenable, as applied to Puerto Rico. Think for example 
about Puerto Rico’s massive debt burden. In response, the Puerto Rican 
legislature enacted a debt-restructuring plan. The U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down the plan, however, on the view that Puerto Rico was a state 
109. This is the basic distinction, Don Herzog argues, between actions by a free agent 
and a subordinate subject. See HERZOG, supra note 26, at 223–25.
110. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648–49 (1973) (“This Court has never 
held that aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high public office under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”); Gerald L. Neuman, “We Are the People”: Alien Suffrage in 
German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal 
Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1394 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: 
Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1094–97 (1977).
111. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and 
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unim-
paired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights . . . .”).
112. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 727 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissent-
ing).
113. Though even what this means is unclear.
114. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998) (exploring why “Americans of today should be bound 
by the decisions of people” of the past).
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under federal bankruptcy law and thus preempted from enacting its own 
plan.115 This is a federal law that the people of Puerto Rico had no hand 
in enacting. Under what legal theory is Puerto Rico bound to obey this 
or any other federal law? Similarly, and more importantly, under what 
theory of obligation is Puerto Rico bound by the U.S. Constitution?
Representatives Nydia Velázquez and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 
have introduced the Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act. The proposal 
directs the legislature of Puerto Rico to call a Status Convention staffed 
with delegates elected by the people of Puerto Rico.116 This Convention 
would work toward a long-term solution to the status of Puerto Rico, 
whether statehood, independence, the status of free association as it exists 
today, or something else. The product of the convention would be put 
to the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum and presented to Congress. 
“The key,” as Representatives Velázquez and Ocasio-Cortez wrote, “is 
that this framework would be developed by Puerto Ricans and for Puer-
to Ricans, not dictated to them like so many previous policies.”117 The 
aim is to provide the people of Puerto Rico with a true exit (or entry) 
option. The Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act is an important and 
needed first step in the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United 
States.
The people of Puerto Rico exist in a para-constitutional space as an 
unincorporated territory. They are U.S. citizens at birth, yet do not have 
the same rights under the Constitution as citizens in the contiguous 
United States. They are subject to laws they did not take any part in en-
acting and live under a Constitution to which they did not consent. Basic 
principles of democratic theory demand more, as do theories of constitu-
tional obligation. This is an issue that constitutional scholars and constitu-
tional law ought to take up with ever increasing urgency.
115. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942–43 (2016).
116. Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, H.R. 8113, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020).
117. Nydia Velázquez & Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Puerto Rico, Not Congress, Must De-
termine Its Future. Our Bill Enables It to Do So, NBC NEWS: THINK (Aug. 25, 2020, 
11:48 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/puerto-rico-not-congress-must-
determine-its-future-our-bill-ncna1238032 [https://perma.cc/V9LD-3WCP] (emphasis 
omitted).
